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First Things
Remembering the Riots
James Nuechterlein
Copyright (c) 1997 First
Things 76 (October 1997): 12-13.
Of the various disasters that littered the 1960s, none was more deleterious
in its effects than the series of black riots that began in Birmingham
in 1963 and became an annual rite of summer for most of the rest of the
decade. The best-remembered of them occurred in Watts in 1965, but the
two most destructive in their toll on lives and property took place thirty
years ago this summer— the first in Newark and then, the worst of all,
in Detroit. I was in Detroit during the disturbance there, and my memories
of the event are still vivid.
The riot began early in the morning of Sunday, July 23, 1967, when the
police raided an illegal bar in the inner city. A crowd gathered in protest,
and within a short time mobs of young men were engaged in burning, looting,
and acts of random violence. Earlier riots had been blamed on police "overreaction"
to minor incidents, so authorities did not at first dispatch large numbers
of officers to the area. They further tried to keep things in check—based
again on presumed lessons from disturbances elsewhere—by persuading the
media to impose a news blackout. Neither tactic worked, however, and things
were soon utterly out of control. The rioting spread to take in fourteen
square miles of black neighborhoods, and unlike some earlier outbreaks,
it was quite indiscriminate: mobs torched and plundered black businesses
as freely as white ones and burned down a number of black homes as well.
In the latter stages of the riot, blacks from outside the inner city entered
the riot zone to participate in the looting.
My wife and I were visiting my brother’s family in Livonia, a western
suburb of the city. We learned nothing of the riot until early Sunday afternoon
when other members of the family arrived to report that in their drive
from the city they had seen vast clouds of smoke rising from black neighborhoods.
Soon afterward the media lifted the news blackout and we began to get the
details.
By Monday morning, news reports indicated that the police and National
Guard had matters under control, and so, as previously planned, we drove
into the city to stay with my sister at her apartment. Kay lived, by choice,
in a racially mixed neighborhood near downtown, only a few blocks from
the riot area. That night the rioting resumed and intensified.
It was hot and the apartment had no air-conditioning, so we kept the
windows open. Playing cards at the kitchen table, we could hear the sound
of rifle fire. A major expressway separated us from the riot zone and we
felt no great sense of danger, but the continuing—and increasing—background
noise of gunfire, much like a war movie soundtrack, made for an unsettling,
even surreal, experience. After midnight, we heard the rumblings of what
we later learned were troop vehicles moving along the expressway. For the
first time in the decade, a riot had gotten so out of hand that the authorities
had to call in federal troops. It took five days to restore order, and
afterwards there were 43 dead, 7,000 arrested, 1,300 buildings destroyed,
and 2,700 businesses looted.
The riots in Detroit and elsewhere had a devastating effect not just
on the communities themselves but on the entire nation. The assorted tragedies
and lunacies of the sixties came near to wrecking the national morale,
and nothing contributed more to the sense of things out of control, of
a nation falling apart, than the ghastly parade of "long, hot summers."
In 1967 alone, according to a recent report in the New York Times,
there were almost four dozen riots and over one hundred lesser incidents
of civil unrest. The antiwar protests of the time revealed a society bitterly
divided over politics. The riots, along with the widespread and often violent
campus disturbances, seemed to indicate a country descending into anarchy.
The riots also shattered the fragile national consensus that had begun
to emerge following Martin Luther King, Jr.’s March on Washington in 1963.
A majority of white Americans had been increasingly persuaded by the moral
appeals of Dr. King and had come to accept the argument that American society
had for too long relegated black people to second-class citizenship. There
was a readiness to make amends. But the riots eroded much of that good
will. They served the cause not of reformers but of racists, and antagonized
millions of Middle Americans who were open to change but closed to the
idea that the nation’s racial sins were so great that it deserved to be
torn apart. The riots polarized a society that had been potentially ready
for significant reform.
The response by American liberals to the riots made things worse. Many
of them found ways to excuse the inexcusable by rationalizing the mob nihilism
manifested in Detroit as radical political protest. They even managed to
persuade themselves, against all evidence, that the riots would have a
positive net effect: white America would finally be brought to see how
desperate was the black plight and thus would be moved to take remedial
action.
The official government response compounded the confusion. President
Johnson’s National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission)
concluded in 1968 that the single most important cause of the riots was
white racism. It would not have been implausible to argue that white racial
attitudes were most responsible, over the long run, for the disabilities
of black Americans, but to attribute the riots to white racism stretched
the causal link to the breaking point.
The Kerner Report also, however inadvertently, demeaned black people
by denying them moral agency. It was one thing to recognize the genuine
frustration about real grievances that led some blacks to lash out blindly,
something else to suggest that the black situation was so hopeless—and
so utterly dependent on white behavior for any kind of amelioration—that
such lashings-out by blacks constituted the only line of action open to
them. The report perpetuated the idea that black people had identities
only as historical victims, people to whom things simply happened. In post-segregationist
America, that was no longer believable.
Most white Americans rejected the claim that they were incorrigible
racists and so simply shrugged off the Kerner Commission’s indulgent exercise
in guilt-mongering. They also, in the light of mounting evidence of the
failure of Johnson’s Great Society programs, viewed with skepticism the
Commission’s claim that only massive government programs offered any hope
for making things better for black Americans. Indeed, the perceived failure
of welfare-state liberalism to solve the nation’s racial problems contributed
mightily to the mounting suspicion that there might be better responses
to social ills than simply spending vast amounts of money on them. The
first glimmerings of what Bill Clinton would much later call the end of
the era of big government can be found in the baffling incapacity of the
received liberal wisdom to offer workable prescriptions for the urban racial
crisis of the 1960s.
The best that can be said thirty years later is that our racial situation,
however bad, is better than it was in 1967. That is pitiably small consolation.
The City of Detroit has never fully recovered from the events of three
decades ago. Neither, sad to say, has the rest of the nation.
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Updated: 13 July 2002
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