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First Things
Books in Review
Augustine and the Limits of Politics
Copyright (c) 1996 First Things 67 (November 1996): 56-58.
A Saint for Our Times
Augustine and the Limits of Politics. By Jean
Bethke Elshtain. University of Notre Dame Press. 118 pp. $21.95.
Reviewed by Mary Ann Glendon.
In this engaging series of meditations, Jean Bethke Elshtain makes a
convincing case that Augustine of Hippo (354-430 a.d.) is a saint for
our times. Originally presented as a lecture series at Loyola University
of Chicago, this little book, Elshtain writes, is "the story of an
engagement, one peregrinus to, and with, another." Thus, a good
deal of its interest and appeal is as a fragment of an intellectual
autobiography of Elshtain herself, one of our most original and
perceptive political theorists.
Why Augustine? One can easily imagine the author of the
Confessions as an exemplar for today's fortyish sons and
daughters of the sexual revolution (and his long-suffering mother Monica
as a source of inspiration for their parents). But Elshtain is primarily
interested in Augustine's relevance to contemporary political
thought.
Her Augustine is a man of paradoxes. She evokes his delight in "the
world" together with his vivid sense of its brokenness; his dedication
to the life of the mind along with his awareness of the limits of
reason; his ease amidst cultural pluralism and multiple interpretations;
his understanding of choice as always constitutive and often tragic; his
struggles with temptation and doubt. Her portrait of the aged Augustine
critically reexamining his life's work in a city on the fringes of a
crumbling empire suggests a sage with something akin to a postmodern
sensibility.
Like a restorer of neglected art works, Elshtain scrapes away the
darkened varnish of centuries to bring out lights and shadows in the
Augustinian corpus. There is much to ponder in her refreshing and warmly
appreciative readings of the City of God and the
Confessions, and in the surprising affinities she traces
between Augustine and modern writers like Albert Camus and Hannah
Arendt. In passing, she rescues Augustine from simplistic charges of
pessimism, misogyny, and anti-intellectualism.
Especially interesting is Elshtain's exploration of Augustine's implicit
cognitive theory. Like Plato, and in contrast to philosophers who exalt
pure intellect, the Bishop of Hippo understood the eros of the mind-the
role that love, desire, and "yearning" play in the process of human
knowing. Moreover, Elshtain emphasizes, he took account of the
embodiment of mind and heart. Augustine knew, as she puts it,
that "the body is epistemically significant, a source of delight, of
travail, of knowledge of good and evil. The body is the mode through
which we connect to the world and through which the world discloses
itself." With frequent quotations, she deftly limns the tactile sense,
the carnal imagery, the curiosity about beings and things that are such
striking characteristics of Augustine's writing. Rare indeed in
philosophical works are passages like the one in the City of
God where Augustine marvels at how some people can wiggle their
ears, others can perfectly mimic the voices of other men, and some can
even "produce musical sounds from their behind"!
It is significant that, for Augustine, the Devil and the bad angels are
without bodies. Evil in his schema is not an active principle, but an
absence. It is not created, but represents "a kind of noncreation, a
draining away" from the goodness of creation. In a fascinating chapter
entitled "Augustine's Evil, Arendt's Eichmann," Elshtain traces the
likely origin of Arendt's concept of the "banality of evil" to the City
of God, where Augustine divests evil of every pretension to glory.
As his cognitional theory is explained by Elshtain, the fifth-century
theologian would be at ease with contemporary philosophers such as
Bernard Lonergan, whose theory of knowing begins with self-
appropriation. Augustine understood that the self "grasps different
truths in different ways at different points, insofar as we are able."
He saw reason and faith as complementary forces that cooperate to bring
the knower closer to the truth.
Late-twentieth-century thinkers are rediscovering many things Augustine
knew-that knowing begins with the self as a basic datum; that the knower
tends to become what he or she knows; and that knowers "must be roused
and shaken up from time to time if [they are] to pay real attention once
again." Some are discovering, too, that nothing shakes up one's settled
ways like Scripture.
What has Augustine to do with politics in the modern world? Elshtain
reminds us that, for Augustine, we are not political by nature. We order
our lives together through connected efforts of will and plan.
Commonality among human beings makes politics possible and worthwhile.
But pluralism and particularity bedevil attempts at common action. The
limits on human reason and the defects in human will translate into
limits on politics. "A human being cannot even be certain of 'his own
conduct on the morrow,' let alone specify and adjudicate that of others
in ways he or she foreordains."
If there is one point about this predicament that Elshtain seems to wish
to stress (and one central affinity among Augustine, Arendt, and
Elshtain), it is that awareness of the fallen and pluralistic nature of
the world "should usher into a rueful recognition of limits, not a will
to dominion that requires others for one to conquer." That is not a
counsel for quietism, or even pacifism. It is simply a recognition that
action takes place on a field of moral danger and ambiguity. Though
Elshtain's Augustine is suspicious of the state with its urge to
dominate, he is no anarchist. He is "respectful of the social and civic
arrangements that sinful man has created." Augustine's teaching, as
Elshtain puts it, is: "Social life on all levels is full of ills and yet
to be cherished."
In the end, the Augustine encountered in this book is not postmodern.
His thought is too rich, too modest, and too fertile. It is well
symbolized by Elshtain's colorful cover illustration from the Book of
Hours of the Duke de Berry. In the background, framed against a bright
blue sky is an elaborate, many-turreted, walled castle; in the
foreground are people and animals in a field of fruit ripe for picking.
Some of the human figures are engaged in humble tasks; one man has
paused to taste the fruit; a pregnant woman is gazing into the distance.
The artist's sophistication, like that of Augustine, coexists
harmoniously with an almost naive appreciation of what God has given and
human hands have made. Though too faith-filled to be a patron of
postmodernity, Augustine does point to what lies beyond-that which is
timeless and timely, ever old, ever new.
Mary Ann Glendon is the Learned Hand Professor of Law at Harvard
University.
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Updated: 13 July 2002
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