School Prayer
I must express my disagreement with your editorial in the February 1995
issue concerning a school prayer amendment to the United States
Constitution. While I am in full accord with many of your arguments-
including the dangers of an imperial federal judiciary, the evils of
"naked public square" thinking, and the incoherence of current Supreme
Court religion clause decisions-I think that your conclusion with
respect to this particular problem misses the mark.
With all due respect, the issue is not whether there will be "voluntary
prayer" in public schools; nor is it federalism and home rule. The real
issue is whether public school teachers, agents of state and local
government, themselves holding religious views as diverse as any other
large national group of citizens, should be permitted to lead
impressionable children in classroom devotional exercises. Should
Christians trust public school teachers to influence the religious
beliefs of their children? More to the point of your editorial, should
each state or each local community be permitted to decide whether
teachers will be given this opportunity and responsibility? My answer is
"no" to both questions.
How would various local communities respond if given the decision? My
guess is that those places with very diverse religious populations,
where no one group would feel confident of its status as majority
religion (New York or Los Angeles, perhaps), would reject teacher-led
devotions. In those places where one religious tradition constitutes a
strong majority (say, Salt Lake City), in-class prayer/devotions might
well be approved by a majority of voters. A majority vote would not
change the wrongness of the decision. A religious minority, whether it
constitutes 49 percent or .0001 percent of the population, should not be
forced to subject its children to offensive religious exercises in the
government-run schools. No matter how much you try to structure
classroom devotions as "voluntary," peer pressure and the authority role
of teachers will always place strong incentives on children who do not
share the majority religious sentiment to hide their discomfort and join
in with the group.
This does not mean that a constitutional amendment dealing with
religious activity in the public schools would necessarily be a bad
thing. There are many forms of school-related religious expression that,
although probably already protected by the First Amendment, the Equal
Access Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, create
significant confusion and censorship among school officials. These would
include individual student expression (religious-message clothing,
private prayer, dialogue with other students, religious topics for class
assignments, etc.), Equal Access student groups, released time religious
education, moments of silence for truly voluntary prayer or meditation,
and perhaps student-controlled prayer at graduation exercises. In all of
these areas, teachers and administrators need to know beyond any doubt
that private religious expression is constitutionally protected, and the
law needs to be clear that "high walls of separation" under state
constitutions cannot trump federally protected rights.
The distinction between individual action and government action is
critical. Because the First Amendment is a limitation on government
activity, there is nothing that a private citizen (such as a student)
can do to unconstitutionally establish religion or prevent free
exercise. Government schools and their employees, however, can violate
the nonestablishment clause and do so whenever they encourage one
religious tradition or expression over others.
Bradley P. Jacob
Center for Law and Public Policy
Geneva College
Beaver Falls, PA
Thanks for taking a straightforward, intelligent stand on the prayer
amendment. You've certainly convinced me.
There is one troubling point, however, involving your calling the
desirable alternative to wrongheaded judicial rule simply "democracy," a
term that we should all know by now was thoroughly understood by the
Founders and wisely rejected. (Fortunately, you tend to offset this
error elsewhere.) This may seem nit-picking, but I believe that to
continue repeating the slightest misconception that we are a
"democracy," an idea which has been largely encouraged by the same
courts you criticize and in fact lies behind many of their erroneous
judgments (along with the idea of "equality"), can only cause further
harm. Many esteemed writers, I believe, might agree. I know Erik von
Kuehnelt-Leddihn's Liberty or Equality backs me up, as would
Russell Kirk, M. E. Bradford, Irving Babbitt (Leadership and
Democracy), etc.
"Democratic capitalism," "democratic self-government," "democratic
process," etc. are all within accepted parameters, but when decisions
are "made by thousands of communities and local school boards across the
country," it is called decentralization and
federalism, not "democracy." The gong-show California
initiative process is probably "democracy" but it is not our
characteristic form of government. "Democracy" was not the goal of the
U.S. Constitution, so let's not apotheosize it. . . .
W. Edward Chynoweth
Sanger, CA
Your editorial about school prayer misses the obvious. The Constitution
may not contain any mention of school prayer by name, but it
does mention that the government may not establish a religion.
The question now becomes does imposed school prayer (one could
and can always pray voluntarily and individually in school) establish a
religion, or go in that direction?
The answer has got to be "yes" if the prayer is to Jesus,
Allah, Krishna, etc. Then it gives government sanction to a specific
religion. The critical thing that your editorial also fails to discuss
is whether any prayer led by or instituted by a school (as an arm of the
government) could really be viewed as "voluntary." Who is to compose
these prayers, and what will guarantee that they do not favor a
particular religion? The task of being neutral would seem to be almost
impossible, and the lack of a mechanism to assure voluntary
participation in the prayers only by those who wish to do so is a
daunting one.
Gordon Stein
Free Inquiry
Amherst, NY
Whose Aquinas?
In his excellent article "Toward a Post-Apollonian Theology" (January),
Pastor Peter J. Leithart misunderstands Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.
Aristotle was attempting to prove God's existence from reason alone,
unaided by divine revelation. Thomas Aquinas, in his proofs for the
existence of God in the Summa Theologiae, was again presenting
what reason alone is capable of proving. Further on in the
Summa Aquinas takes up what God has revealed about His triune
nature, and he argues that this is something that human reason could
never arrive at on its own. However fitting it may be that God exists as
three Persons, without His self-revelation our reason can arrive at
little more than that He is the ultimate cause of some observed effect.
On the other hand, it is truly marvelous that Aristotle saw that
inasmuch as God is the cause of all being, He cannot be in need of any
created thing. The human intellect simply cannot see any reason why God
should have created us, much less why He should care about us. In the
words of the Psalmist (8:5), "What is man that You should be mindful of
him, or the son of man that You should care for him?" That God is love,
and what that might mean, might enter in some feeble way into the mind
of a poet or a holy man, but it could never be proved by rational
argument.
That God exists is not a marvel, it is only a simple fact without which
nothing else would exist. That we exist and that He cares about us, in a
totally disinterested manner, i.e., without the possibility of any real
gain on His part, that is the marvel of marvels! Those who have not
received God's revelation, or who have rejected it, can never know this
truth.
E. William Sockey, III
Thomas Aquinas College
Santa Paula, CA
Peter J. Leithart replies:
Mr. Sockey's letter betrays the same theological errors I find in
Aquinas. Both claim that natural theology is true as far as it goes, but
needs to be supplemented by special revelation because of the limits of
human reason. Paul wrote, on the contrary, that God has revealed Himself
clearly in creation, but that sinners suppress and distort the truth
(Romans 1:18-32). Aristotle's theology, by Paul's diagnosis, was the
product of suppression and distortion; though such a theology may
occasionally stumble on the truth, fundamentally it is not merely
limited but false. The unmoved mover is simply not the God Christians
worship. It is not true, moreover, that Aristotle was "unaided by divine
revelation." It would be more correct to say that he was unaided by
special revelation, though most of the Church Fathers expressed doubts
even about that.
Profound Dialectic
I found "The Zionist Imperative" by Emil L. Fackenheim (February)
compelling and incisive both as regards its historical awareness and
breadth and as regards its well-reasoned and decisive conclusions. It is
not mere coincidence that a number of profound dialectics that are only
seemingly unresolvable are presented in this article: the particular and
the universal, the secular and the spiritual, action and reflection, the
mundane and the miraculous, horror that enervates faith and profound
insight that reillumines faith despite the multiplicity of reasons to
suppress it.
It is the putatively unresolvable nature of these dialectics that so
confounds and disturbs the Arab/Israeli peace process specifically and
the modern and postmodern world in general. Yet Fackenheim weaves, like
a golden thread, through all the expedient and casuistic rationales and
in doing so emphasizes the extreme consequences and dangers in failing
to do so. . . .
Michael Bond
Lakewood, CO
Renewing Your License
Christopher Wolfe in "The Marriage of Your Choice" (February) advocates
legislation to make it possible for a couple to choose to enter freely
into an indissoluble marriage. I would like to propose an idea of my
own.
I would make the marriage license valid for only a stated period of
time, like a driver's license. At the end of the period, say four years,
it would expire unless renewed by both parties. For the stated period
the marriage would be indissoluble, with only separation legally
possible. This arrangement, like present laws, would have no effect on
one's religious belief that marriage is for life and divorce impossible.
This arrangement would have several effects. It would force couples to
deliberately renew their covenant if they wished their marriage to
continue. If they did not, it would die quietly without all the mess and
expense of a legal divorce. They could make their own arrangements about
children and property.
Over time, couples who renewed their marriage license might want to make
the time longer, say ten years or the rest of their life. Perhaps some
state might try this as an experiment. The results could not be worse
than they are now.
Charles J. Robbins
St. Joseph's College
Rensselaer, IN
Murdoch the Moralist?
Alan Jacobs, in "Iris Murdoch's Go(o)d" (February) notes with palpable
discomfort the recent efforts of a conference of scholars "to
investigate and celebrate the theological importance of the writings,
especially the novels, of Iris Murdoch" (emphasis added).
Few contemporary novelists or philosophers (and Murdoch is both) embrace
an orthodox faith, and she is evidently no exception. From this must we
conclude, ipso facto, that no spiritual insight can be gleaned from
their works?
People of faith who confine their search for spiritual significance in
fiction to the writings of professing believers will find themselves
working off a rather short reading list. Fortunately, we need not be so
confined. Chalk this up, perhaps, to the Holy Spirit-to the tendency of
truth to bubble to the top of an inspired and accomplished literary
broth.
As luck would have it, I was reading Murdoch's The Time of the
Angels (1966) when Jacobs' article came to my attention. The Spirit
(I would submit) permeates the pages of Angels. Consider
Murdoch's Leo and Muriel: two young freethinkers discussing
life. Leo is rebellious and hedonistic; Muriel is
"experienced," but thoughtfully so:
"Yes, I'm an aesthetic type. I have no morals.
You don't believe in God and all that crap, do you?"
"No," said Muriel. "Though that's not the same
as having no morals."
"It is, you know. I'm one of the problems of the
age. . . ."
While noting that Murdoch's "reputation rests chiefly on her twenty-five
[!] novels," Jacobs is preoccupied with her philosophical writings.
Prof. Jacobs, an English teacher, should have stuck to the novels. It is
these that will be read in the next century-these that should be read
today.
George G. Peery III
Annandale, VA
It would be amazing indeed if a philosopher of some ability were to
assure us of the objectivity and independence of goodness for five
hundred pages, and then on page 506 "give the game away" and turn out to
be merely a subjectivist about the good after all. Especially when the
philosopher writes on page 508 that our "experience of the reality of
good is not like an arbitrary and assertive resort to our own will; it
is a discovery of something independent of us, where that independence
is essential."
Yet that is just what Alan Jacobs assures us is the case in Iris
Murdoch's book, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. The offending
passage, moreover, immediately follows Murdoch's assertions that "art
and high thought and difficult moral discernment appear as creation
ex nihilo, as grace. The Meno concludes that virtue
does not come by nature, nor is it teachable, but comes by divine
dispensation." Something must be wrong.
And indeed, it is not hard to find an interpretation of the passage
Jacobs cites that squares with the general theme (and title) of the
book. Murdoch is here talking about the experience of the artist or
thinker who "concentrates on the problem, grasps it as a problem with
some degree of clarity, and waits." Then something comes "out of the
dark of non-being, as a reward for loving attention" (p. 505). What
comes? The poem, the solution to the equation, the resolution of the
difficulty. Without such "loving care," nothing good, nothing beautiful
can be achieved. That is the sense in which "the good artist, the true
lover, the dedicated thinker, the unselfish moral agent . . . can create
the object of love."
It is not, as Jacobs would have it, that the Good "exists
[only] insofar as it is worshipped." Murdoch's claim at this point is
that existing good things (particular truths, works of art,
moral acts) depend as much on the "spiritual energy" of the agent as on
that mysterious-and independent-source of all good things.
Murdoch's book is difficult, as the writings of mystics usually are. But
no one should be deterred from its rewards by mistaking it as a mask for
pragmatism or subjectivism. It is worlds away from both.
Norman Melchert
Easton, PA
I greatly enjoyed Alan Jacobs' "Iris Murdoch's Go(o)d." He's
right: compared with most other "serious" novelists on either side of
the Atlantic, Murdoch is a commanding talent. However, given the current
state of "literary" fiction, that's not saying all that much. It's easy
to be less sloppy than John Updike and still be quite undisciplined.
It's easy to be less depressed than Joan Didion and still be far from
hopeful. If, by comparison with most of her contemporaries, to say
nothing of the new generation of novelists now coming into print,
Murdoch provides a "fresh and exciting alternative," that fact says more
about standards in fiction overall than about any standards Murdoch may
have set for herself. . . .
Brawn Sullivan
Marysville, CA
Alan Jacobs replies:
When George C. Peery claims that spiritual insight can be gained from
the writings of unbelievers, or people of unorthodox beliefs, does he
expect me to disagree? But when he suggests that one must choose between
Murdoch's philosophy and her fiction, there I must demur. I don't see
why we can't read both.
Norman Melchert is right to point out passages from Murdoch's book that
could lend themselves to a different interpretation than mine, and I
thank him for his thoughtful response. But I am not convinced by his
reading. If Murdoch is merely saying that our "spiritual energy" is
necessary for good things to happen in the world, and believes that
there is some ultimate "source" for those good things, then why does she
return repeatedly to the theme of creating the good? Is she
just sloppy in her use of words? For surely it is not difficult to
distinguish an energetic and imaginative response to goodness
from the creation of it. Moreover, if Murdoch believes in a
"mysterious source" of goodness, why does she say, in a passage
Professor Melchert quotes, that the reward for goodness comes "out of
the dark of non-being?" Can non-being be a source of anything?
What I understand Murdoch to be saying in the passages Professor
Melchert refers to is that goodness has no source, does not exist prior
to our creation of it, but becomes independent of us after we
create it. It goes out into the world and, if accepted by
others, has meaningful effects. That is why I identify Murdoch with
those modern artists who seek a "supreme fiction," that is, a
metanarrative which we know to be our own creation but which we choose
to live by and subject ourselves to.
What Price Ecumenism?
I look forward eagerly to the "roundup and commentary" on developments
concerning the declaration "Evangelicals and Catholics Together"
(foretold in "While We're At It," January). The declaration has
generated, if nothing else, an enormous volume of extremely interesting
conversation, printed and otherwise, all of which has given reflective
Christians much to chew on.
In the meantime, I am compelled to comment on Richard John Neuhaus'
review of Pope John Paul II's new best-seller, Crossing the
Threshold of Hope (The Public Square, January). It can hardly come
as a surprise that many Catholics and evangelicals are uneasy about the
declaration, calling as it does for ecumenical convergence, both
theologically and programmatically, when they read here of the Pope's
theological perspectives, intended, we must assume, as the official
teachings of the Catholic Church. I confess that I have not read the
book, and yet I trust that Neuhaus is giving us a balanced and generally
dependable, if incomplete, account of its contents.
I refer in particular to several passages in which Neuhaus recounts the
Pope's views on ecumenism and on soteriology. First, ecumenism. Many
evangelicals note that the original declaration says very little about
the Reformation, and in fact leaves much unsaid about the three great
"sola" cries of the Reformers. For many protestants, sola gratia,
sola fide, and sola scriptura capture the central biblical
truths that are the heart of the faith, and without which there is no
truly Christian-and certainly no truly evangelical-faith. On this view,
the solas constitute a great theological divide between Protestants and
Catholics that no amount of progressive convergence can or should
remove.
Consider, then, this passage from Neuhaus, including his quotation
from Crossing: "The healing of the breach between Rome and the
Reformation requires an appreciation of a 'certain dialectic' in how the
Holy Spirit leads us into all truth. 'It is necessary for humanity to
achieve unity through plurality, to learn to come together in the one
Church, even while presenting a plurality of ways of thinking and
acting, of cultures and civilization.' Divisions, then, may have served
a purpose, but that does not justify continuing divisions that do not
serve the truth."
With these few words, the distinctive faith of the Reformers, resting on
the biblical pillars of sola gratia, sola fide, and sola
scriptura, is thrown onto the pile of divisions that do not serve
the truth-unless, of course, Neuhaus and the Pope intend to repair the
cleavage by affirming the solas themselves. The concern of many
Protestant evangelicals-that the price of the proposed ecumenism is the
renunciation of the great biblical truths of the Reformation-appears, in
spite of the placations of J. J. Packer and others, to be well-grounded.
I can only imagine that many Catholics, well aware of the Council of
Trent, will be similarly suspicious of the cost Catholic teaching will
likewise pay for the proposed theological convergence.
Niel Nielson
Wheaton, IL
Unfair Treatment?
How to complain without whining-more easily said than done, but I must
say that the treatment I have received at the hands of the First Things
editorial staff has been anything but "ecumenical." First, in a "briefly
noted" book review of Beyond Culture Wars (October 1994) the
reviewer spent more time lamenting my "strident Reformed view of
Protestant orthodoxy" in connection with Christians United for
Reformation (CURE) than in dealing with the content of the book. Richard
John Neuhaus added another log in February (The Public Square-While
We're At It section): "Being unecumenical can be fun. Who doesn't miss
something in the bare-knuckled religious polemics of yesteryear?" Next,
Catholic Answers is said to have "struck up a polemical
friendship" with me. "Mr. Horton is hard-core Calvinist and what he and
Catholic Answers have in common, aside from the pleasure of
polemics, is a strong dislike for the declaration 'Evangelicals and
Catholics Together.'" "If that declaration is right," he concludes, "it
might take a lot of fun out of bashing each other."
I mean, really. Who is getting "a lot of fun out of bashing each other"
after all?
What CURE and Catholic Answers have in common is not "the
pleasure of polemics," but a passion for what we believe to be life-and-
death issues of truth. Since Catholic Answers is defending
Roman Catholic teaching (including Vatican II) and CURE is affirming
classical Protestant teaching, neither group is engaging in outrageous
behavior: we simply stand with our confessions. And since Fr. Neuhaus
has the experience of having been both a confessional Protestant and now
a Roman Catholic, his ecumenical agenda should surely have room for us.
But, alas, it does not. Where we have only criticized "Evangelicals and
Catholics Together" on its own merit-without the slightest condescending
ridicule for its authors-Fr. Neuhaus has offered merely the latter to
his critics.
As for my own views, let me set the record straight: I am a confessional
Protestant who believes that the Gospel that was proclaimed by Luther,
Calvin, and their ilk is identical to that announced in Scripture. In
spite of fruitful dialogue, the Roman Catholic position (evidenced in
the new Catechism) reaffirms Trent, and the "evangel" of
"evangelicalism"-justification sola fide-has yet to be embraced
by any official magisterial declaration. I do not, however, believe that
this has to be the end of the story. With brothers and sisters in the
Roman Catholic Church I too long for reconciliation, as we both come to
understand the greatest news ever heard, but some of us (Catholics and
Protestants) still believe that a shallow understanding of the doctrinal
issues can only lead to a shallow unity in the long run. I do not expect
Fr. Neuhaus to agree, but in fairness I could have hoped that, in
Christian charity, he would at least have tried to understand.
Michael Horton
Anaheim,CA
Richard John Neuhaus replies:
I have elsewhere in these pages noted that Catholic Answers
wants it understood that it views "Evangelicals and Catholics Together"
favorably. I not only agree but strongly agree with Mr. Horton that "a
shallow understanding of the doctrinal issues can only lead to a shallow
unity in the long run." In the short run, too. "Evangelicals and
Catholics Together" says that-emphatically and repeatedly. As for the
book, briefly noteds must be brief, and authors understandably think
their book deserves more attention. Finally, I do, both in charity and
in respect for truth, try to understand. Nothing in Mr. Horton's letter
leads me to think that in this case I have not succeeded.
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Updated: 13 July 2002